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You can't make an omelette without 
breaking eggs . 
-Vladimir Ilich Ulyanov 
(Nikolai Lenin), and 
Jack Nicholson (the Joker), 
Batman 
The ~overeignty of this House is not a 
matter that is up for grabs-that is 
perfectly clear. 
-Prime Minister Major, 
House of Commons 1 
The European Community (EC) is 
poised between 31 December 1992, 
the target date for the completion of 
the internal market, and the coming 
into force of the Maastricht Treaty 
on European Union (TEU) upon 
ratification by Germany. 2 The TEU 
presents integrationists with the con-
stitutional structures for a decisive 
move to federation whose legal foun-
dations currently run far deeper than 
popularly represented. Consequently 
there is urgent need for informed 
public participation in the shaping of 
European structures. Furthermore, 
there is growing discussion in the EC 
institutions on proposals for a Euro-
pean Constitution directly enacted by 
Union citizens. 3 At the same time, 
the recent currency upheavals cul-
minating in the weakening of the 
exchange rate mechanism raises ques-
tions of the stability of the EC's 
foundations. 4 This article aims to 
provoke debate by raising arguments 
on a series of issues in the light of 
the legal approfondissement and in 
reaction to it. Section I summarizes 
the constitutional advance of the EC 
prior to the TEU towards the legal 
system of a federal nation. Section II 
. raises the issues of spill-over, nation-
.alism, democratic deficit, debate, ref-
erenda, social marginalization, and 
rig_hts in the light of this undiscussed 
approfondisseme.nt. Section Ill exam-
- ines some of the effects of the TEU 
on the lines of development con-
. sidered in the first two sections. 
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I. The Rubicon 
Since the Treaty of Rome ( 1957), 
the EC has been suspended between 
a confederation and a federation . 
The EC has been explained with 
characteristic clarity to be sui generis; 
it is, above all, a creation of law. 
Constitutional lawyers who have 
taken seriously the implications of 
the claims of EC law, as interpreted 
by the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Communities (ECJ), have been 
steadily lining the banks of a legal 
Rubicon. This Rubicon is the legal 
division between the constitutional 
conception of a European state and a 
sui generis community. In the sui 
generis community, constitutional 
lawyers can uneasily claim that their 
national constitutions are still the 
basic law. In a European state such 
claims will no longer be possible. 
Judge Barrington of the Court of 
First Instance clearly stated: "It has . 
been said that when great changes 
are taking place in the exercise of 
power in society, lawyers are the first 
people to spot the signific&nce of 
what is happening. The general 
public is not disturbed provided the 
forms of authority remain the same. 
The lawyer, in his day to day prac-
tice, must be sensitive to where 
power actually lies." 5 There are 
bridges over the Rubicon for ser-
vices, workers, and capital. National 
constitutional lawyers, on the other 
hand, face compulsory baptism. 
The EC law dynamic has always 
been ahead of the popular (mis)-
conception of the EC: ''Article I of 
the Treaty of Rome establishes the 
European Economic Community. 
The remaining 247 Articles of the 
Treaty are concerned with technical 
arrangements for operating such a 
community. Yet economics is not 
really what the Treaty is about." 6 
The authors of those 247 articles 
found this somewhat surprising . 
Indeed, in the case of van Gend en 
Loos, three of the six member states 
submitted briefs stating that the 
Treaty was a compact between states. 
"Wrong," said the Court. The 
member states had underestimated 
the importance of creatintr an inde-
pendent institution with the p<mcr to 
make binding interpretations of the 
law.' According to the Court: "the 
Community constitutes a new legal 
order of international law for the 
benefit of which the states ha\'e lim-
ited their sovereign right~. albeit 
within limited flelds, and the subj~ts 
of which compromise not only 
Member States but also their 
nationals."~ 
The ECJ has subsequently laid 
down the following additional con--
stitutional principles. EC law is 
supreme, even over subsequent con-
tradictory national legislation. Q It 
must be applied uniformly through-
out the Community. 111 The economic 
principles contained in the article~ on .-
the free movement of g()()~s . work-
ers, services and the freedom of 
establishment apply supremely, uni- · 
formly, and direCtly without the l!l-ed 
for activity by the EC legislath·e 
organs (the Council and the Commis-
sion). 11 The express wording of the 
articles which create the free mo\e-
ment principles confines their appli -
cation to discriminatory national 
laws. Thanks to the ECJ, these prin-
ciples now overrule e\'en non-
discriminatory national laws which 
impede their realization. • ~ Dircctin:s, 
according to Article 1!!9, must be 
implemented by the member state~ 
and are binding only as to the result 
to be achieved . According to the 
Court, not only may unimplemented 
directives be in\'oked effecti\'ely In 
invalidate the rele\'ant national legis-
lation in litigation between pri\'all' 
parties, but member states mmt rtl'o 
provide a remedy in damages where 
non-implementation has caused 
loss . 11 
In short, the Treaties are the "con-
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srirutional charier" of the Commu-
nity,,. and the fundamental constitu-
tional structures of EC law tend 
_towards those of a national legal 
system . The phrase "European 
Union" has already been employed 
in the ECJ's jurisprudence, the 
Single European Act, and the 
Solemn Declaration of Stuttgart. 15 
The validity of a national society's 
basic value choices of a moral (e.g., 
concerning pornography) or a cul-
tural (e.g., Sunday trading) character 
are tested by EC law. 16 When 
national constitutional commitments 
of the most fundamental kind, be 
they the sovereignty of parliament or 
human rights, conflict with EC law 
they can be overridden. 17 There is 
simply no way a uniform, supreme, 
directly applicable, and encompassing 
legal system can sidestep the varying 
fundamental commitments of twelve 
states. There cannot be nations 
within a nation; there can be only 
one perfecto communitas, or none at 
all. EC legal logic says the Rubicon 
must be crossed. 
The ECJ has successfully avoided 
such conflicts while establishing 
national constitutional structures. Is 
there ~ way to continue through the 
use of derogations or subsidiarity? 
As regards derogations, these were 
often claimed by member states seek-
ing to bluff their way out of the eco-
nomic obligations of the treaties 
while trying to hold on to the bene-
fits-legal mercantilism. Consequent-
ly, the tests which the ECJ evolved 
in response closely restrict deroga-
tions; they apply irrespective of the 
ground of derogation. Some of these 
tests employ EC conceptions of the 
public interest, necessity in a demo-
cratic society, and the proportion~lity 
of the restriction of an EC right by a 
national constitutional right or value 
-concepts which make sense only in 
a complete political community. 18 
In short, naiional concepts. 
What about subsidiarity? As in a 
magic mirror in a horror film, one 
sees one's own vision of Europe in 
subsidiarity. The indeterminacy of 
the concept presents commentators 
with thl! opportunity to build their 
own church . Juridically, however, 
there are two primary possibilities. 
First, the ECJ may not treat sub-
sidiarity as a juridical constitutional 
concept; it could characterize it as a 
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political principle. Second, the Court 
may determine the juridical content 
of the principle, probably in the inte-
grationist vein highlighted above. 
Any time the constitution of the EC 
has been clarified, it has become 
more federal. The area of application 
of subsidiarity applies only to areas 
where the Union shares competences 
with the member states (Article 3(b) 
(TEU)), not in areas of exclusive 
competence such as the fundamental 
freedoms, competition, etc. There is 
little in life, from language require-
ments to euthanasia, which does not 
effect a market economy, and thus 
potentially conflicts with principles 
within the Union's exclusive compe-
tence. There is the chance that sub-
sidiarity will be used to avoid con-
flicts in emotive areas in order to 
better construct the norms of federal-
ism-which will be well established 
enough to crack the eggshell of 
national constitutions when the time 
comes. The key question at the 
Rubicon is independent self-deter-
mination, a question which subsidiar-
ity appears at best to skip, if not to 
answer in the negative. 
II. "Belling the Cats" 19 
From the perspective of EC law, 
the EC is very close to a disguised, 
federal nation; politically, this is not 
the case. Given the depth of legal 
federalization, several stalking issues 
need to be "belled" in the public 
debate on the future shape of 
Europe. 
One argument has been that eco-
nomic integration spills over into 
political and social areas. Because 
economic principles are supreme, it is 
necessary to integrate these political 
and social areas in order to preserve 
them from being shaped by eco-
nomics. Quite incredibly, the Treaty 
on European Union (TEU) which 
advances greater integration adds a 
new Title IX and Article 128 which 
proclaims a Europe of flowering of 
cultures. Culture through economics, 
diversity through harmonization! But 
the contrary argument, that eco-
nomic integration should be limited 
and informed by important social 
and political characteristics in mem-
ber states, that economics is a means 
to securing the various political goals 
of the nariom of Europe. i~ rerrm·d 
"anti-European." This epithet 
assumes that there is only one true 
European idea, whose content and 
value has been agreed: it exclude~ 
debate. "Pro-European" is often 
joined to "the need for a democratic 
Europe," trendy phrases which have 
become at best the very pith of 
demagoguery, perhaps the forerunner 
of oligopoly. One of the few lawyers 
in 30 years of EC law to mount a 
sustained critique of the EC was 
quickly shot down as un-European . :o 
One could argue that a European 
can see the future as peace between 
the peoples of Europe, without hav-
ing ·so little respect for them as to 
make them one people. This is not 
"narrow nationalism." Some 
extr~me historical manifestatiom of . 
nationalism tell us more about the 
tendencies of human nature than 
about the destructiveness of the 
social and legal arrangement of 
nationhood per se. The same tenden-
cies and conditions can regroup 
around "Europe." Has patriotism, a 
concept involving duties, concern, 
and allegiance to other than self, 
become a despised virtue contrary to 
the European ideal? Do "true Euro-
peans" really think that the con-
trolling element of selflessness in 
patriotism can be preserved but 
transferred by successful marketing, 
like freely moving capital, to 
Brussels? 
One can also raise questfons on the 
"democratic deficit." This (!encr.ally 
refers to the absence of tmn~l"areru.:y 
in the workings of the Comrni~sion 
and Council of 1\·tinisters, l\nd the 
restricted role of the directly elected 
European Parliament (EP) in the 
legislative process . Using the emotive 
term "democratic deficit" to encour-
age reform of the EC disguises the 
assumption on which it rests: if the 
legitimacy of its supreme legal power 
is drawn directly from the I"C<lple. 
bypassing the nations,- then a federal 
nation will be formed . Even if 
another EC institution was created 
along the lines of the United States 
Senate, the bicameral legislature 
would remain within the structure of 
a federal state. 21 The democratic 
deficit could thus be solved by the 
effective destruction of national par-
liaments' legislative powers and the 




- is one of the great contradictions of 
EC rhetoric that a democracy is 
assumed to be the goal of an un-
democratic process of power transfer. 
The immediate democratic deficit is 
the absence of articulate debate on 
whether or not national democracies 
should be overridden by a central 
European state. If the peoples of 
Europe knowingly answer yes, then 
the second step may be to debate the 
absence of democratic institutions 
therein and the need, if any, for a 
senate or for the role of the Council 
to be reduced to this function. One 
of the hallmarks of the European 
debate is its willingness to leapfrog 
the first step. 
Thatcher's "No, no, and no" and 
aggressive newspaper headlines do 
not constitute articulate debate. Nor 
do they · constitute an attractive alter-
native to the urbane, organized 
European propaganda (the word 
"propaganda" is used without nega-
tive connotations). It is not enough 
to sense that something .is rotten in 
Brussels. Academia has failed to be 
impartial: there has been no con-
certed movement in disintegration 
theory or states' rights. As regards 
law, it is almost exclusively EC and 
not constitutional lawyers who write 
on EC law. Although this is under-
standable, it leaves the field free 
from its natural critics. Even when 
EC lawyers are inclined to criticism, 
integrationist accounts of the law will 
be predictive and cutting edge, 
whereas arguments of caution will be 
old-hat and consequently less attrac-
tive to publishers. As regards eco-
nomics, despite the lack of indepen-
dence of the Cecchini Report (1988) 
on "the cost of non-Europe," which 
was requested by the Commission to 
support their initiative, economists 
refrained from widespread calls for a 
funded study to critically examine 
these assertions or propose 
alternatives. 
As regards popular debate, the ref-
erenda in France, Ireland, and Den-
mark are good examples. In Paris, 
corporate-sponsored posters jostled 
for space to declare for Europe; in 
the country fields in the Isle de 
France, handpainted boards propped 
against scarecrows appealed to 
passing motorists for "Non a 
Maastricht." In Ireland, the crucial 
question of whether the content and 
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effectiveness of human rights upheld 
by national courts should be ulti-
mately decided at national or at EC 
level was completely lost in the emo-
tional debate surrounding the rights 
at issue. The government followed · 
the established practice of threaten-
ing economic extinction. In Denmark 
at least the text of the Treaty was 
widely available. But it is also the 
most worrying example of all. They 
voted No. "Wrong," said "Europe." 
They cannot vote no-the Treaty was 
resubmitted with a superior market-
ing campaign. There is no real 
change in the legal effects of its pro-
visions, although the implications of 
some are spelled out. 22 If the mem-
ber states hade made real changes 
they would have been obliged to 
renegotiate, and where applicable 
reratify, the TEU; this would have 
delayed the march towards closing 
the "democratic deficit." In the 
United Kingdom the government 
approach was simple-to avoid a 
referendum. If this is how national 
systems handle debates of constitu-
tional importance, perhaps nothing 
worth losing is at stake. At least the 
EC institutions believe in themselves. 
Integration has been successfully 
advanced by the skillful effort of the 
ECJ and the Commission. One can 
say that integration has greatly con-
tributed to stability amongst the 
member states, particularly in con-
trolling the belligerent nations of the 
first half of the century. But one can 
also query whether in this process 
integration has attained an indepen-
dent value. What one must ask is 
whether the EC has succeeded where 
the member states have failed to 
deliver on the post-war promise; 
whether unemployment, the inequita-
ble division of resources, marginal-
ization, loss of community, anomie 
have been alleviated; whether the EC 
has elevated to the status of constitu-
tional value the same failed market 
principles free from the qualifications 
of social and legal context of the 
member states; and whether the EC 
paradoxically follows the reduction, 
typical of world communism, of 
social and political thought to eco-
nomic analysis. Some disparities in 
societies appears inevitable. Capital-
ism undoubtedly encourages dispari-
ties in wealth amongst citizens within 
a society. Adopting market econom-
ics at the European level not only 
entrenches this dh·ision hut al~o 
encourages dispadtics between ~ode · 
tics; indeed, the si1.e of the di~p:lrity 
becomes the yardstick of the pnlitkal 
worth of a society. Capitalism l'll 
· stilts. The power to correct scx·ial 
evils is dispersed between the l:C and 
the member states or simply plnccd 
in the invisible hand, and no one can 
be held accountable for fnilure . A 
failed generation of national politi-
cians has deprived its successors of . 
the power to try. Politicians, comti-
tutional lawyers, economists all keep 
their status·. No one keeps rcspon· 
sibility. 
Arguments countering tf1ese dairn~ 
tend toward!! supplying reasons for 
greater integration, for the tran~fer 
of powers, for belie\'ing that what 
has not worked at national k\'cl will 
work at EC level. If it doesn't, the 
"Brussels bureaucrats" can he 
blamed. An attractive !lupplcm~ntnry 
argument is that EC law granis addi-
tional rights to individuals. Everyone 
wants rights. In general, situatiom 
may occur where ECJ decisions 
create rights sought by some minori-
ties in some member states who can-
not secure these rights through 
democratic means. This inahilit\' is 
perhaps because of the value · · 
accorded to connicting rights, or per-
haps because of the lethargy (iT the 
national sy!ltem. Recognition of 
rights may or .may not constitute 
social progres!l, according to one's 
viewpoint and the rights in qpcstion . 
But when a decision dcpri\'CS a right, 
even a majority in a mcmbct sta(c 
cannot change it without calling into 
que!ltion the EC's legal ba.,es. of 
supremacy, uniforrnity, and dim:t 
applicability (Section I, suiJra) . Now 
is the time for questions. 
There is a tendency to prodaim 
that EC law rights liberate Europeans 
from the oppressive restraints of 
national governments. Two points 
need be noted here. In the first plnrc, 
any EC law overrules all national law 
of whatever nature. Trumpeter~ of. 
EC law rights tend to omit to refer 
to corresponding duties or the lirnit:t· · 
tion of connicting national rights and 
powers which may serve cqunl or 
greater human values. An outstand· 
ing example of disingenuitv was 
given by the Irish goverm~cnt's 
marketing posters during the TEU 
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referendum: "Guarantee the right to 
travel, the right to information, and 
the right to life of the unborn. Vote 
yes." These rights were all already 
guaranteed under the national consti-
tution: what had to be resolved was 
their relative values in cases of con-
flict. Against whom were they to be 
guaranteed? Were the Irish agreeing 
to ask the EC to guarantee rights 
against themselves? In the second 
place, courts and treaties can print 
rights like trea~uries can print 
money. 21 For example, one may 
accept the idea of conferring an EC 
law right on non-nationals (soon to 
be European citizens) to vote in local 
elections. This must be weighed 
against the dilution of the effective-
ness of a national's right to vote in 
his own elections. 
III. The Treaty on 
European Union 
It is unwise to predict the meaning 
of the TEU until the ECJ has inter-
preted it after ratification. Ratifiers 
are to an extent thus debating blind-
ly . However, in the light of the 
above, five points in the TEU should 
be mentioned here which continue 
the transformation into a European 
federal nation: 
I . Article C declares that the 
Union shall respect and build on the 
" 'acquis communautaire.' " This 
includes the landmark constitutional 
decisions of the ECJ to which the 
national peoples give the seal of 
approval either directly by referen-
dum or through their representatives 
in parliament. 
2. The ECJ has already developed 
a remedy in damages for private liti-
gants against member states for 
breach of EC law obligations 
(Francovich) . 24 Article 171 allows the 
ECJ to impose a fine itself directly 
on the member state if the Commis-
sion sues for failure to comply with a 
prior judgment. 
3. Article B states that an objec-
tive of the Union is "to strengthen 
the protection of the rights and inter-
ests of the nationals of its member 
states through the introduction of a 
citizenship of the Union." This is of 
course an extremely important fed-
eralizing concept which both the 
Danish people and the French picked 
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up on: "European .citizenship opens 
the way to European sovereignty, 
which will be incompatible with 
national sovereignty." 25 It leaves the 
meaning of citizenship ambiguous at 
both the Union and the member state 
level. Article B refers to only 
strengthening rights, which is 
impossible: the single concept of 
citizenship of supreme EC law must 
conflict in parts with twelve different 
national concepts of citizenship. It is 
difficult to overestimate its signifi-
cance; the "symbolism" is con-
stitutional. 
4. The directly elected European 
Parliament (EP) is given a limited 
role as legislator. For example, under 
Article 189(b)(c) it has the power to 
veto measures adopted under certain 
articles by the Council and Commis-
sion. Before these regulations, direc-
tives, and decisions come into force, 
under Article 191 the President of 
the EP must sign together with the 
President of the Council. Once 
again, this development may or may 
not be welcomed. An increase in the . 
role of the EP increases the power of 
Europeans qua Union citizens who 
elect it. The flipside is a decrease in 
the power which Europeans qua 
Portuguese, British, German, confer 
to their elected representatives who 
will form a national government with 
both powers at home and control of 
the EC legislature via the Council. 
5. The Protocol on the Transition 
to the Third Stage of EMU declares 
"the irreversible character of the 
Community's movement to the third 
stage of Economic and Monetary 
Union." This touches on a key issue 
of very advanced conversion to a 
United States of Europe-indissolu-
bility. It is to be noted that Protocols 
(as distinct from Declarations) have 
the same force as Treaties by virtue 
of Article 239 EEC. The U.K. and 
Denmark have opt-outs if they ratify. 
Ratification of the TEU is a land-
mark on the route to the dissolution 
of nationhood in the Rubicon of EC 
constitutional law. The TEU means 
what it says, and more besides, as 
the development via interpretation 
and application of the Treaty of 
Rome proves. The TEU accentuates 
the existing tension between two 
levels of quasi-nations-the member 
states and the Union. This situation 
will give rise to cases of conflict 
before the ECJ which is obli!Zed in 
resolving them "to ensure that in the 
interpretation and application of the 
Treaty the law is observed ." The 
ECJ has proved itself, by the exercise 
of skill and ingenuity in the past, 
capable of this great task, but the 
peoples of the member states or at 
least their representati\'es in parlia-
ment must rcali1.e the implication~ of 
such interpretation . Politicians arc 
generally concerned with the power· 
of decision making; they have over· 
looked the fact that law is concerned 
primarily with normative order . 
Questions of state sovereignty are an 
area of overlap of these perspec-
tives. 2~ Politicians may reali1e the 
oversight when Francm•idr type 
actions cause charges on public 
funds. By then it may be too late for 
debate because the normative order 
after the TEU will have changed. 
The ECJ's interpretation of the TEU 
after ratifica.tion will tell wi whether 
the Rubicon has been crossed. The . 
· direction in. the TEU is clear. 
Those Who wish the European pro-
ject to succeed: and to eirdure, Olll~t 
point to two defects. first, thi~ level 
of integ~ation pro\·ides ·an obstadc to 
expansion. of the. Union. Even if 
expansion can succeed, there will be 
a certain, perhaps unintentional .' 
imposition of values on poorer, . 
recently independent countries. Ihese 
will be presented with a fait accom-
pli. Does this square with the 
member states' obligations or wishes 
with respect to, for example, the 
countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe, with which ihe EC has ron-
eluded trade, cooperation and asscx:i-
ation agreements, and to Turkey?:· 
The EC cannot gloss over this point 
by non-sequiturs such as the follow-
ing: "The European Contmunity has 
to proceed towards a federal-type 
European Union, now that there are 
several actual or potential applican.ls 
waiting to join . "~~ 
Second, the following related 
problems in the pedigree of the 
Union may misshape it. There are 
difficulties in escaping from an origin 
where market economics is rai~ed to 
the level of constitutional principle 
(e.g., Article 102a (TElJ)). Furthcr, · 
the proponents of the project of 
European integration have seemed . 
ready where necessary to sacrifi~.:e 
both the human ends protected in 
13S 
national constitutional law and the 
democratic processes os informed 
consent in national politics in order 
to strengthen the means of integra-
tion. The proponents assure us that 
the end of this integration is a Euro-
pean, federal nation which will be 
the paradigm of "politically correct" 
democracy. Democracy does not 
spring fully armed from the head of 
a bureaucrat; uniform political cor-
rectness and a flowering of diverse 
cultures are irreconcilable. The lack 
of security which comes from the 
absence of an unequivocal mandate 
from informed publics in whose 
name the project is, or should be, 
undertaken, forces federalists to inte-
grate faster and deeper. To break the 
back of national constitutions, of 
nations, and to present European 
citizenry with a fait accompli before 
they fully realize it is not an 
auspicious rebirth for Europe; nor is 
the prodigy likely to last. The 
peoples of E!Jrope have this great 
right: to determine their future . 
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